Відео

My grandfather was a dock worker in Sydney. In WW2 he was loading grain into a frigate for a blockade run though the straits of tears, Bab-el-Mandeb, the cargo net broke and he got badly hurt. Permanently lame. He was the only civilian with a Australian navy pension. There was sabotage on the docks, Stalinist working for Adolf! No one was caught. You guys have it easy today.

I'm really surprised there isn't a direct engine driven generator capable of running the cooling pumps, oil pumps, fuel pumps, and any critical engine systems for redundancy sake so the engine will keep running even in the event of a total bus failure. That seems like a massive oversight which introduces several catastrophic single point failure scenarios. Also systems that prioritize saving expensive components like the engine by tripping it offline in the event of the pumps losing power makes perfect sense when in open ocean with no obstacles and plenty of time to troubleshoot and make repairs but those fail-safes turn into fail-deadly during critical phases of operation - the fact that they aren't able to be disabled or at minimum overridden in critical situations is crazy imo.

Take that MSM !

No, thank YOU. Just don't forget the difference between "the way it's always been done" and what's possible. Have a great week!

Could closing an exhaust damper valve be a very lazy way of turning off a running engine? I don’t know anything about ships.

Nice explanation Chief. I was a Master on container ships for a 25 years. One thing no one is talking about is the state of tide at the time of incident If it was an ebb tide (following the vessel out) it becomes very difficult to maintain steerage at low speeds even with an engine running and if a vessel loses power she will quickly lose steering ability as the V/L slows. That could be a reason as to why even the emergency power rudder operation was ineffective. Another perpetual problem I faced on literally every single V/L was low insulation alarms in either the 440V or 220V or sometimes both. It would take endless hours of work to eliminate these alarms and sometimes despite all the isolating of systems via the switch board it couldn’t be solved. This could also be an issue in tripping of power. Could you comment on this?

Can these circuit breakers be tripped remotely via a signal of some sort, or are they analog type breakers that are not capable of receiving signals?

The black smoke was cause by lack of fuel on the generators. The generators had been running on “gravity” fuel with no load. The fuel filters were probably close to empty when the crew restored power to the main bus. The sudden load caused generators to underspeed as the generators could not supply need power with low fuel supply. The breakers for the generators tripped when generators undersped on low voltage right after that.

Must test the meat bring cat on board or 🐜 ants if they eat it it's ok n freeze first or in fridge for 30 minutes with 🧂 salt

Seguata

Chief Makoi, you are an excellent teacher! Thank you for the diagram that gives more detail than the NTSB report-it helped this non-engineer to understand and follow your explanations.

This accident could have been prevented with a proper Activity Specific Operation Guideline (ASOG). Such as, having one generator running on each side of the HV bus (bustie closed or open), both transformers in operation, and LV bustie open. In this configuration, if one transformer tripped off, the opposite side of the LV bus would have stayed powered. Suppling oil, water, fuel to the main engine and steering to rudder. You cannot control single point failures (such as breaker failure), you can only position the equipment in such a way as to minimize the failure of a single point, which was not done here.

Retired Master here, great work chief,😊 Thank you Sir.❤

Those rolling seas remind me of when I transited the Bearing Strait as part of the crew of the USS Salt Lake City (SSN-716) back in 2005. We were transiting submerged at 400 ft below the surface and I can't even begin to imagine how rough it was up there. We were rolling pretty wildly at a level that is usually unaffected by surface weather. Aside from the rolling of the boat though, it was an otherwise smooth transit.

All that scale from the rust removal all of it goes into the environment, the sea. Its devastating to local harbors. Tons of it over the years makes the bottom of the harbors toxic wastelands.

Is it possible that a TR1 failure could have caused this, or most of it? It sounds like the ship had been using TR2 for months until this trip.

Just saying thanks for all your content (been subscribed for many years) and also hoping I get an honest reply to my follow-up question. Be harsh. I won't be offended.

Thanks Chief between you and Sal, I understand what (not how) happened. Retired USn Interion Communications elect, that was qualified on 600lb. steam plant generator watch standing.

Thank you for the expert analysis Chief ❤

Nice job, Chief. Thanks!!

As an industrial electrical technician for almost 30 years. I appreciate the Chief detailed explanation. I will be awaiting any more videos especially when the final NTSB report is released. I do understand going thru alarms as I have troubleshoot failures on production lines to find the root cause of the line's shutdown. You have to figure out which specific alarm was the cause of the shutdown. You can only figure that out if you have a through understanding on how a particular system operates and how it can fail. Thank you, Chief.

I know the name of the game is "as cheap as possible" when constructing cargo ships, but I feel there should be a generator connected directly to the main engine, that's powerful enough to run fuel, lube oil, PLUS the emergency panel. There are many ways to deal with the massive RPM difference. The generators at the Hoover Dam are designed to run at 180 RPM. You have an "AC WILD" (varying frequency) like they do in some aircraft. Alternatively, you could use hydraulics to stabilize things - this is what they do in ambulances. Engine driven hydraulic pump runs a constant RPM generator for frequency stability. Maybe you disconnect all of it once out at sea, maybe you don't. But the prime mover of the ship should be able to sustain itself without relying on a complex mix of auxiliary generators, switchboards, etc. Too many failure points. I am actually reminded of a disaster on a much smaller (150 foot) fishing vessel. The diesel engines originally came with a primary electric fuel pump, and a backup mechanical fuel pump. At one point, the ship was modified for two electric fuel pumps. Well, they lost the AC bus, lost the fuel pump, lost both engines, lost control, and sank. Auxiliary diesels are great in port or for house loads, but the prime mover should be self sufficient.

Thanks Chief!

Thank You

excellent analysts and explanation

Is it crazy to say there should be an override that prevents the main engine from shutting off, even if damage is probable, when navigating through areas like underneath major bridges? Idk about you but I’d rather destroy that ships engine then have a collision with a major bridge and cost the country billions of dollars and lives. Who cares about the health of the engine when the alternative is way worse. An override should be mandated.

Your explanation is very clear and makes sense to me.

Thank you Chief for lending your extensive expertise to analyze the situation. Excellent and insightful!

Great video, Chief. I agree, the preliminary report practically asks more questions than it answers. The automation system should have automatically taken care of things that were done manually. Without knowing what really happened, it sounds like some major mistakes were made by the crew. Particularly since the ship had related problems only a few hours before departure.

@ Chief Makoi, thanks for such a clear concise and clinical explanation of the vessels Power management system. In hind sight do you feel it would have been safer to run the vessel with a split bus while in enclosed and pilotage waters and returning over to a single bus power management system when the vessel is on ocean passages. The vessels Chief engineer/Eto/technical superintendent along with class should have identified the single point failures which can result in propulsion loss and recommended a safer option while in enclosed waters. The reasons given for the first black out in port is questionable and flimsy but of course subject to further enquiry, however my question is did the on board team file an incident report to the technical management after the incident and what were the mitigating measures enforced to avoid reoccurrence. After watching your analysis I do feel the ACTUAL reason behind the first black out in port(most probably an issue with TX 1)is the real reason behind what caused this maritime disaster. Dali has a sister ship Cezane will be interesting to note if they have been ordered to operate with a split bus in confined waters after the Dali incident. Bean counters sitting behind computers in far flung offices often dictate costs of vessel operation over safety, the poor sea farers on board will have to face the music.

Good morning chief, please does it mean that HT(jacket cooling water) doesn't go to LT central cooler?

Great analysis. I am thinking the first electrical outage was differential TX protection operation on TR1 for a (transient) fault? The emergency generator does not have appeared to have started within 45 seconds - the (full) ship lights coming back on was a result of the manual close of the Tx breakers, re-energising the LV bus supplied from DG3/DG4. I wonder if the black smoke (Which started soon after after the breakers were manually closed) is related to DG2 automatically starting but insufficient pressure to run DG3 and DG4 as well as DG2? This then caused the on-load generators DG3 and DG4 to stall/trip? The reports makes reference to insufficient fuel pressure tripping DG3 in relation to the outage that occurred in the previous day at Port.

What about Bow Thruster?

As an old Submariner-Electrician, I'm horrified by the electrical system of this ship, and I assume that this is an "industry standard".

Brilliant video Chief. Looking forward to the follow up on this. As an electrician I am right into this one.

@13:18- "Is this the man..... who dis-abled a Beverly Hills Police Department vehicle..... with... a banana?"

6:50 the guy behind you needs a new hair stylist.🇺🇸

Chief, I am not a mariner so I do not know these systems but your explanation was spot on and helped me understand. You mentioned that the generators continued to run possibly by gravity feed after the fuel pumps went out. Then you said you did not understand why the same generators tripped their breakers. I think you hit on it without knowing it. If they were siphoning fuel it is entirely possible that either air got in the line while it was in suction or more likely the there was not enough fuel in the line and the pumps did not catch up fast enough so the generators slowed down on fuel starvation. You said that this is one reason they will trip out. I am just thinking of this from the perspective of what I know as a diesel mechanic.

I still don't understand why propulsion is necessary for the rudder to be effective. Movement through the water, yes, but not necessarily propulsion. Did the ship move?

thanks so much for your report as I am an apritance electrician in the reestural side I dont know about ship systems and your digram was great to help me understand ships systems and I found your throw Sal's youtube channel

Well done, Chief!!

Sim4crew is shutting down in sept 2024

Retired industrial electrician. Thank you for the explanations. Good to see you, Chief.

Why didn't the Dali have both transformers connected while they left dock? I can understand them thinking it wasn't necessary, but is there any reason that would be impossible or unwise?

What a great walk through. Thanks

Regarding rudder ineffectiveness when propulsion is inoperative, is the rudder ineffective for a two-pronged, compounding set of phenonmena - namely that the propeller is not thrusting water past the rudder, AND that the slowing or stopped propeller is also now actually blocking much of the water flow that otherwise would be available from the speed of the ship as it continued to coast thru the water relatively faster than the prevailing local current?

Great Report! I’m a Mechanical Engineer with lots of Building power wiring experience. A couple of technical questions. I’m going to assume 3 Phase power, so: 1.) Do ship power systems employ Ground Fault Circuit Interruption? 2.) If so at what level? Individual breakers or panel wide? 3.) What about phase loss or imbalance protection? I’ve seen Ground Faulted 15 HP motors take out 1000 HP Chiller panels on GFCI. Buss bar mechanical shifts causing open phases or outright explosions, yeah been there too.

Why is the captain not required to drop anchor as soon as there are any major power issues, which would harm the ability to effectively steer the ship? If anchor had been dropped immediately after the first blackout, there would have been more than twice as much time to stop the ship.

damn I want one of those donuts